Bernanke proposes Systemic Risk Authority
The US needs an overarching regulatory authority to prevent a repeat of risks building up unchecked across the financial system and exploding into economic crisis, Ben Bernanke said on Tuesday. He said the financial crisis, which had seen huge risks building up in lightly regulated institutions, had revealed the weakness of fragmented regulation.
“We must have a strategy that regulates the financial system as a whole, in a holistic way, not just its individual components,” he said. “In particular, strong and effective regulation and supervision of banking institutions, although necessary for reducing systemic risk, are not sufficient by themselves to achieve this aim.”
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6d4f943a-0d6e-11de-8914-0000779fd2ac.html
Excerpts from his speech:
We should consider whether the creation of an authority specifically charged with monitoring and addressing systemic risks would help protect the system from financial crises like the one we are currently experiencing.
The consolidated supervisors must have clear authority to monitor and address safety and soundness concerns in all parts of the organization, not just the holding company.
How could macroprudential policies be better integrated into the regulatory and supervisory system? One way would be for the Congress to direct and empower a governmental authority to monitor, assess, and, if necessary, address potential systemic risks within the financial system. The elements of such an authority's mission could include, for example,
(1) monitoring large or rapidly increasing exposures--such as to subprime mortgages--across firms and markets, rather than only at the level of individual firms or sectors;
(2) assessing the potential for deficiencies in evolving risk-management practices, broad-based increases in financial leverage, or changes in financial markets or products to increase systemic risks;
(3) analyzing possible spillovers between financial firms or between firms and markets, such as the mutual exposures of highly interconnected firms; and
(4) identifying possible regulatory gaps, including gaps in the protection of consumers and investors, that pose risks for the system as a whole. Two areas of natural focus for a systemic risk authority would be the stability of systemically critical financial institutions and the systemically relevant aspects of the financial infrastructure that I discussed earlier.
Introducing a macroprudential approach to regulation would present a number of significant challenges. Most fundamentally, implementing a comprehensive systemic risk program would demand a great deal of the supervisory authority in terms of market and institutional knowledge, analytical sophistication, capacity to process large amounts of disparate information, and supervisory expertise.
Other challenges include defining the range of powers that a systemic risk authority would need to fulfill its mission and then integrating that authority into the currently decentralized system of financial regulation in the United States. On the one hand, it seems clear that any new systemic risk authority should rely on the information, assessments, and supervisory and regulatory programs of existing financial supervisors and regulators whenever possible. This approach would reduce the cost to both the private sector and the public sector and allow the systemic risk authority to leverage the expertise and knowledge of other supervisors. On the other hand, because the goal of any systemic risk authority would be to have a broader view of the financial system, simply relying on existing structures likely would be insufficient.
For example, a systemic risk authority would need broad authority to obtain information--through data collection and reports, or when necessary, examinations--from banks and key financial market participants, as well as from nonbank financial institutions that currently may not be subject to regular supervisory reporting requirements. A systemic risk authority likely would also need an appropriately calibrated ability to take measures to address identified systemic risks--in coordination with other supervisors, when possible, or independently, if necessary. The role of a systemic risk authority in setting standards for capital, liquidity, and risk-management practices for the financial sector also would need to be explored, given that these standards have both microprudential and macroprudential implications.
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Bernanke’s Systemic Risk Authority The FSOC / OFR
Immediately upon announcement of his idea, Bernanke’s almost purely academic concept of macroprudential[1] systemic risk early warning became massively political with US senators and congressmen laying oily Washington paws all over Bernanke’s sketch book model. In the spring of ’09, the Fed was ‘wide open’ to criticism as having failed totally at supervision, a quite un-fair criticism really since the US supervisory landscape is actually really fragmented with many layers of institutions having responsibility in that space, partial responsibility, in fact much like the EU where in fact the Directorate General ECFIN does actually do some macroprudential functions only it doesn’t really take on that responsibility. Think of Eurostat and its relation to DG ECFIN.
In the US, Senator Barney Frank’s House Financial Services Committee had to write the legislation[2]. Of course the main point is that all of the developed western economies were actively considering this type of response to the Crisis in early 2009; the US, the UK & in the old days we would have considered Germany but as a committed European the Germans allowed Cion to do that consideration with the Bundesfinanzministerium bending its ear. In France the spectacularly independent Banque de France took the view (some would say quite rightly) that it did not need any assistance with macroprudential analytics, it was quite good at that itself, the Swedes and the Dutch (again some would say quite rightly [me included]) much the same thing.
By early 2010, the New York Times reported that responsibility for macroprudential early warning was going to reside in the US Treasury with Geithner as Chair and the Federal Reserve chairman as deputy. Bernanke’s systemic risk authority would become a council[3];
the NYT reported. To cut a long story short Bernanke’s Systemic Risk Council idea became wrapped up in what came to be known as the “Dodd Frank”[4] (DF) legislation process, (unfortunately) a massively political wrangle in the US in which other issues not directly related to macroprudential early warning such as concerns over TBTF; “Too Big to Fail” or Financial Institutions which became so systemic they could not be other than bailed out.
DF proposed a Financial Stability Oversight Council, made up of Expert Members: the10 federal financial regulators and an independent member and 5 nonvoting members, the Financial Stability Oversight Council will be charged with identifying and responding to emerging risks throughout the financial system. The Council will be chaired by the Treasury Secretary and include the Federal Reserve Board, SEC, CFTC, OCC, FDIC, FHFA, NCUA, the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (& ‘uncle Tom Cobley and all’). DF is widely despised by experts in banking supervision and those with knowledge of Monetary Economics or Macroprudential issues. Quite “Frankly” it’s a dogs’ breakfast which seems to be a racing cert when politicians get a grip on supervision.
Its probably worthwhile clarifying one more nuanced ‘private language’ code word which is subsumed under DF, given that we have placed ‘Dodd Frank’ in a context already, that is “The Volker Rule”; which requires supervisors to implement regulations for banks, their affiliates and holding companies, to prohibit proprietary trading, investment in and sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity funds, and to limit relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds. So in essence the Volker rule is the US legislation of the Independent Commission on Banking in the UK which we have studied extensively here[5] on asymptotix. The Volker rule is simply a bringing to life of an act called “Glass Steagall”, as Andrew Ross Sorkin (who wrote the movie “TBTF”) argues in his DealBook presence in the NYT;
But I am getting lost in the DF labyrinth, what happened in the end to Bernanke’s Systemic risk early warning system idea?
The Financial Stability Oversight Council[7] got established under the Dodd-Frank Act;
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) will provide, for the first time, comprehensive monitoring to ensure the stability of our nation's financial system. The Council is charged with identifying threats to the financial stability of the United States; promoting market discipline; and responding to emerging risks to the stability of the United States financial system. Within the US Treasury there is an Office of Financial Research also, which is chartered to improve the quality of financial data available to policymakers and facilitate more robust and sophisticated analysis of the financial system[8]. At the beginning of this year the OFR made a significant contribution to Macroprudential Analytics in this document[9];
A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics
Dimitrios Bisias, Mark Flood, Andrew W. Lo, Stavros Valavanis
I would personally have prepared if the code would have been developed in R but hey that is another story and I can always translate it. Mark Flood is well known to asymptotix in another place and through other times and as one would expect the thinking behind Systemic Risk Macroprudential early warning is in complete alignment with the Rational Expectations (REH) approach which one would expect in this space. I strongly recommend that anyone with a real interest in this topic studies this document seriously.
[1] http://www.asymptotix.eu/content/term-macroprudential-origins-and-evolution
[2] http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a_H7XBO4IEB8
[3] http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/18/business/18regulate.html
[4] http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf
[5] http://www.asymptotix.eu/category/tags/independent-commission-banking
[6] http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/reinstating-an-old-rule-is-not-a-cure-for-crisis/
[7] http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/default.aspx
[8] http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/ofr/Pages/default.aspx
[9] http://asymptotix.eu/lFH
DAVOS 2010 - asymptotix