The de Larosière Group Recommendations
The advice to EU president Barrosso from the De Larosiere Group. This report is published as the world faces a very serious economic and financial crisis. The European Union is suffering. An economic recession. Higher unemployment. Huge government spending to stabilize the banking system – debts that future generations will have to pay back. Financial regulation and supervision have been too weak or have provided the wrong incentives. Global markets have fanned the contagion. Opacity, complexity have made things much worse. Repair is necessary and urgent. Action is required at all levels – Global, European and National and in all financial sectors.
http://ec.europa.eu/.../global_report_-_final.pdf
We must work with our partners to converge towards high global standards, through the IMF, FSF, the Basel committee and G20 processes. This is critical. But let us recognize that the implementation and enforcement of these standards will only be effective and lasting if the European Union, with the biggest capital markets in the world, has a strong and integrated European system of regulation and supervision.
In spite of some progress, too much of the European Union's framework today remains seriously fragmented. The regulatory rule book itself. The European Unions' supervisory structures. Its crisis mechanisms.
This report lays out a framework to take the European Union forward.
Towards a new regulatory agenda – to reduce risk and improve risk management; to improve systemic shock absorbers; to weaken pro-cyclical amplifiers; to strengthen transparency; and to get the incentives in financial markets right.
Towards stronger coordinated supervision – macro-prudential and microprudential. Building on existing structures. Ambitiously, step by step but with a simple objective. Much stronger, coordinated supervision for all financial actors in the European Un ion. With equivalent standards for all, thereby preserving fair competition throughout the internal market.
Towards effective crisis management procedures – to build confidence among supervisors. And real trust. With agreed methods and criteria. So all Member States can feel that their investors, their depositors, their citizens are properly protected in the European Union.
In essence, we have two alternatives: the first "chacun pour soi" beggar-thyneighbour solutions; or the second - enhanced, pragmatic, sensible European cooperation for the benefit of all to preserve an open world economy. This will bring undoubted economic gains, and this is what we favour.
We must begin work immediately.
Jacques de Larosière, Chairman
Are the key legislative pillars such as Basel II & III, UCITS IV and Solvency II forcing you to re-examine how you identify, measure and manage risk and capital?
Is the goal of your website to sell services or products, educate, or collect data?
Comments
Misleading Incentives and the Super-Supervisor Scrum-Down
Note, that what will be brought forward to ECOFIN and The European Council is CION’s recommendations, not the De Larosiere report per se; it is the recommendations of CION predicated upon that report (I understand that the recommendations are pretty well dotted and crossed). These recommendations will actually be drafted by Commission Officials, who are a smart bunch of cookies, educated at the great Universities of Europe in economics of all sorts of flavours and hews! (cf my friend’s literary essay IN THE NAME OF THE ROSE).
The CAD (Capital Adequacy Directive) process in Europe pre-credit crunch used to work differently; the CAD3 legislation was basically an enactment of the drafting of the Basel Committee, with some nips and tucks, tweaked by commissioner McCreevy’s team or as a result of some shouting at the microphone in the parliament! It’s different now, the Commission is drafting legislation and with enormous input and validation from the International Monetary Fund (the IMF); as always x-pollinated with Europeans. It’s still a bit of a club that banking supervision process but the members have changed - my friend’s deckchairs analogy pertains!
In this context it’s easy to see now why the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) can no longer be the global supervisor. Clever Economists in the European Commission, who almost understand the objectives of Banking Supervision better than the small secretariat in Basel, because of their multi-faceted experience of industrial and competition policy issues for example and the realities of the requirements of their Economic forecasting, are necessarily going to have more traction with the banking super-highway and the monetary authorities than gnomes in Basel. Notwithstanding that, Basel will still I expect continue to produce the finest research in the globe on matters of risk management. But CION and “the Fund” (insider’s term for the IMF) are together in the front row, ready to engage in a scrum with the bankers. Which side would you prefer to be on? One thing is for sure. CION cannot be the locus of European Banking supervision from a political institutional perspective - that would not be acceptable to those of a more ‘economic’ political outlook (free market). One aspect then of the proposals to ‘The Council’ will be a new institutional proposal for sure from CION, again see my friend’s essay for some interesting speculation on that!
Marco Buti introduced JDL on Thursday morning with his comment that he believed that CION is leading global thinking on the reform of global Regulatory and Supervisory frameworks post crisis. Buti said that the consensus with the Americans, refereed by the IMF is coming towards the European perspective and that European perspective is what JDL thinks (although Otmar Issing’s thematic got a special mention).
JDL described the basis of his analysis of ‘La Crise’ as being the consequence of “Misleading Incentives” and “Securitisation Abuse’! Not wholly a regulatory failure but partially. He argued that enforced “Mark to Market” as opposed to periodic “Fair Value” exacerbated the process of collapse and that the failure of the Basel II process to get Capital Constraints upon Off-Balance sheet instruments implemented (as required by Pillar II [the Gordy Formula]) triggered the crisis. In addition he emphasised the inadequacy of “VaR and only VaR” in capturing the risk of a trading book. What de Larosière is aiming at is “Supervisory Efficiency” which he argues the current 3L3 committees quite simply do not have and that means he argues Europe is terribly exposed to the next potential ‘monetary slippage’! His main aim is the very high ground; his key commitment is to super-supervisors with teeth, in summary. He sees the IMF’s FSAP programme as absolutely crucial. He believes FSAP should be compulsory upon national governments, explicit and enforced (that means that bankers should take account of it too, as I argued in Dublin in 2006!) In the European case JDL is committed to his policy proposal (which probably will not get implemented) which is that a European Systemic Supervisor (a Super-Supervisor) should be implemented with very sharp teeth and “under the aegis of The European Central bank”, interlocked with the IMF FSAP methodology. This systemic super-supervisor is the locus of Macroprudential oversight, crisis early-warning and micro-prudential methodology, not the BIS!
The bit that will not get implemented because it is political with a small ‘p’ is ‘under the aegis of the ECB’; there will be a helluva of a cat-fight, turf-war, call it what it what you like about where this ‘authority’ will be located on May 27th!
The de Larosière Report (the DLR [not the Canary Wharf train!]) is the final priority action of this Commission, it is “Top Priority”, JDL described it as an optimal theoretic compromise between market economics and social market economics. The 3L3 committees need teeth, McCreevy gave them budget last week, it’s up to the Ministers to give them authority. The last action of CEBS then will be the damp squib European Stress Test but there is an irony with CEBS.