I have been reviewing the papers from a recent conference;-
The ESRB at 1
& I think there is a crystallisation of a theme at that conference reflected in one particular presentation which articulates a narrative that we have been developing here on asymptotix in regard to Stress testing over the last 2 or 3 years.
Liquidity Risk is a confused topic (from a supervisory or B2 perspective)
because it has not been clear whether this is a risk type to be treated qualitatively or quantitatively through the development of the Basel II (B2) accords. In the initial months after the first Basel Accords were published most European regulators discussed the challenge of Liquidity Risk in qualitative terms. Latterly however the emphasis has been on the need for regulated financial institutions (FI) to stress test this aspect of Market Risk. This stress testing requirement demands that Liquidity Risk be treated quantitatively, from the perspective of a methodological approach to capturing how the FI’s exposure to this risk may fluctuate under extreme conditions.
The Spanish authorities present the results of this excercise as two stress test reports (by Oliver Wyman & Roland Berger) & one independent assessment of those ST excercises by Promontory Group.
Further in the Spanish authorities statement is a presentation of the process for the detailed audit of the Spanish banking sector's overall exposure.
It's LTRO that I’m talking about this time! LTRO the latest version of “economic life support those” crackpot surgeons in the Central Banks and Treasuries of Europe have come up with. What is the issue with it? As LTRO2 approaches, to on the leap day (29/2/2012) I present a number of theses about LTRO;
1. LTRO is a workaround for Crowding Out
2. LTRO is executed via a process called 'Round Tripping' or known as a ‘Carry Trade’
3. Hedge Funds are intrinsic to the success of LTRO
4. This makes governments dependent upon Hedge Funds (& not just the banks)
5. LTRO creates a cash balloon which props up the equity market
6. LTRO is a high-risk central bank strategy which could deflate at a stroke
7. Ironically the very Hedge Funds and Asset Managers who are intrinsic to the success of LTRO are already freaked out by the high risk nature of the policy,
Bayesian Methods in
Portfolio Credit Risk Management
A dissertation submitted to the
SWISS FEDERAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
for the degree of
Doctor of Sciences
JONATHAN ERIK PURVIS WENDIN
MSc. Engineering Physics KTH
born 17 April 1978
citizen of Sweden
accepted on the recommendation of
Prof. Dr. Alexander J. McNeil, examiner
Prof. Dr. Peter L. Bühlmann, co-examiner
Prof. Dr. Philipp J. Schönbucher, co-examiner
IMF Global Financial Stability Report - September 2011: Europe bank's exposure to the eurozone debt crisis increased to €300bn
Europe bank's exposure to the eurozone debt crisis has increased to €300bn (£263bn).
The epicenter of sovereign risk has been Greece, which generated the first of four waves of spillover to European banks. The analysis suggests that, first, spillovers on European bank exposures to the Greek sovereign have amounted to almost €60 billion (Figure 1.17). Second, as sovereign risks spread to other governments, the spillovers to banks have mounted. If the sovereign stresses in Ireland and Portugal are included, the total spillover rises to €80 billion. Third, the governments in Belgium, Italy, and Spain have also come under market pressure; incorporating credit risks from these sovereigns into the analysis further raises the total estimated spillover, to about €200 billion. Fourth, bank asset prices in the high-spread euro area have fallen in concert with sovereign stresses, leading to a rise in the credit risk of interbank exposures; including those exposures increases the total estimated spillover to €300 billion overall. Although these numbers are based on market assessments of credit risk, which may reflect a degree of overshooting, the underlying problems that they highlight are real.